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I. INTRODUCTION

In the last several years, Irish courts have awarded ever
larger damages to defamation plaintiffs.1 Because Irish libel law
weighs heavily in their favor, these plaintiffs, who are often
political figures 3 and other well known public figures, 2 generally
prevail in court.
One such plaintiff was Noelle Campbell-Sharp, who won a
1997 judgment against the IRISH INDEPENDENT, a prominent
newspaper company. 4 Campbell-Sharp was best known as owner
of Irish Tatler magazine, which had recently gone bankrupt. s
Hugh Leonard, a well-known Irish playwright and columnist, had
criticized Campbell-Sharp in her weekly column. 6 Leonard
mistakenly claimed that Campbell-Sharp owed him payment for
some articles she had written,7 Campbell-Sharp had actually just
sold Irish Tatler to a larger publishing company when she
commissioned the articles.8 Campbell-Sharp won damages of
IR£70,000. 9 With costs, the judgment against the newspaper
came to over £200,000.10
Irish journalists and law reformers have charged that
defamation liability decisions such as Campbell-Sharp v.
Independent Newspapers (7RE) Ltd. have seriously impeded
freedom of expression.1 1 Freedom of the press is particularly
endangered, as liability costs have forced Irish newspapers to be
cautious about publishing controversial material and have
1.
See, e.g., Michael Foley, Papers Would Not Have Risked CallingAitken a
Liar UnderIrish Libel Law, IRISH TIMES, June 23, 1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL
12011235.
2.
See id.
3.
See, e.g., Foley, supranote 1, at 13.
4.
See Campbell-Sharp v. Independent Newspapers (IRE), Ltd., No. 5557
(Ir. H. Ct. May 6, 1997).
See Plaintiff's Statement of Claim (Sept. 28, 1992), Pleadings at 8,
5.
Campbell-Sharp(No. 5557).
6.
See Transcript of Jury Action (Apr. 29, 1997), at 6, Campbell-Sharp
(No. 5557).
7.
See id. at 6-7 (citing Hugh Leonard, Leonard's Log, IRISH INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 26, 1992, at 3L).
See id. at 8-10.
8.
9.
See infra text accompanying notes 172-73. In U.S. dollars, the
judgment comes to $100,562, or $287,320 with costs. See N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
1997, at C17 (as of February 3, 1999, an Irish punt was worth 1.4366 U.S.
dollars).
10.
See Letter from Michael Kealey, Solicitor for the Dublin law firm of
McCann FitzGerald and Counsel for the SUNDAY INDEPENDANT, to author (Jan. 30,

1998) (on file with author).
11.
See infra note 182.
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discouraged investigative
reporting. 12 Further,
newspaper
publishers commonly ask attorneys to read each weekly edition

for

potentially

defamatory

statements

prior

to

printing.1 3

Concerns about liability have also prevented the release or even
14
publication of certain books in Ireland.
Yet the Irish Constitution has always recognized a right to
15
freedom of expression, as well as a host of other personal rights.
After centuries of British rule ended in 1921, and most of Ireland
had achieved independence, the new Irish state chose to draft a
written constitution recognizing specific freedoms, rather than to
adopt the English model of an unwritten constitution. 16 The
current constitution of the Republic of Ireland, Bunreacht na
h~ireann, recognizes the right of the citizens "to express freely
convictions and opinions." 17 It also calls for the State to prevent
the media from undermining public order or morality, while it
preserves the media's right of liberty of expression, including
criticism of Government policy. 18
The problem is not that this language has been interpreted to
guarantee an insufficient freedom of expression; rather, the
problem is that Irish courts have largely failed to interpret this
language at all, and when they have done so, it has been in
dicta. 19 In contrast, the United States has an established
tradition of constitutional review of defamation cases. In the 1964
United States Supreme Court decision, New York Times v.
Sullivan, the Court held that the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press and free speech placed certain limits on the
traditional common law of defamation.2 0 From that point on,
defamation cases were subject to constitutional judicial review. In
Ireland, however, there is no established tradition of
constitutional judicial analysis, and the substantive influence of
Bunreacht na hireann upon Irish jurisprudence is minimal in

comparison to the influence of the U.S. Constitution upon

12.
See infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
13.
Interview with Paula Mullooly, former Solicitor, McCann FitzGerald, in
Dublin, Ireland (May 1997).
14.
For instance, Kitty Kelley's recent bestseller, THE ROYALS, was not for
sale in Ireland until after September 23, 1997, due to distributors' liability fears.
See Michael Foley, Chain to Import Book on Royals, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 23, 1997, at
8, availablein 1997 WL 12026198.
15.
See infraPart II.
16.
See JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 8-13 (2d ed. 1992)
(discussing the adoption of a written constitution in Ireland in 1922).
17.
IR. CONST. art. 40.6.1.i.
18.
See id.
19.
See infra Part 1II.B.
20.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
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American jurisprudence. Instead, Irish courts have emphasized a
continued adherence to traditional English common law, which
has served as virtually the sole source of law in defamation
21
cases.
Understanding the present state of Irish defamation law
requires an understanding of why Irish courts tend to approach
Ireland's constitution with what is essentially an English
constitutionalist perspective. This judicial attitude is unexpected,
in part, because Ireland fought a bloody war against the British in
this century in order to break free from British rule. One might
expect that the Irish would be equally eager to break from, or at
least critique, British common law and constitutionalism. An
American commentator summed up this apparent irony well:
The struggle [for Irish independence] was conceived in the

bitterness of a racial memory, conducted by both sides to the
accompaniment of... 'atrocities', and concluded in an atmosphere
of enduring animosity. Yet [it] is surprising that Irish leadership
retained so much of its English political heritage. It is almost as if
there had been a serious failure of political imagination. 2 2

Judicial and constitutional conservatism have allowed Irish
defamation law to remain remarkably close to its English common
law origins. But the common law of defamation was not designed
for a modem democracy with a free press, and Ireland's libel laws
have a profound effect upon freedom of expression. If Ireland is to
be a modem democracy, as its constitution asserts that it is, and
the European Convention on Human Rights demands, it must
protect a core area of free expression in order to allow the press
(without the fear of repercussion) to keep the public informed
about matters of concern. Once this minimum degree of freedom
of expression is attained, Irish courts can begin to weigh other
interests, including the right to one's good name, against free
speech interests.

Reforming Irish defamation law is therefore essential to
Ireland's status as a democracy. It is also required by Ireland's
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Ireland's
Supreme Court should review current defamatory law and impose
necessary reforms in order to render it constitutional.
Part II of this Note will examine Irish constitutional history,
with attention to the conservative, traditionally often English,
21.

See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IRELAND 19371966, at 2 (1967). Beth goes on to suggest that the reason for Ireland's failure to
break away from English constitutionalism may actually lie in the fact that the
Irish were never very completely Anglicized, as the American colonists were, and
in the fact that Americans had the opportunity to develop a unique political
approach before independence. See id. See also discussion infra Part I.
22.
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influences that have led to Ireland's avoidance of an Americanstyle constitutional review. In Part III, this Note will describe the
current Irish defamation law accompanied by an analysis of the
Irish decision, Campbell-Sharp v. Independent Newspapers (IRE),
Ltd. This section will also survey the impact of defamation law on
freedom of expression. Part IV will discuss the level of freedom of
expression required by the Irish Constitution and the European
Convention on Human Rights and propose reforms to the law of
defamation. Part V will conclude with some final comments.

II.

IRISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF THE
CRISIS IN DEFAMATION LAW

The Irish were bold enough to fight and win a war of
independence from Great Britain in this century. 23 Even now, the
Irish remain in many respects suspicious of governmental
authority, which they associate with British oppression. 2 4 Yet the
Irish Constitution that was born from the ashes of British rule is
essentially a conservative document, solicitous of the legal status

quo.25 A number of political forces in play during the early years
of the Irish State, some of which continue today, meant that the
Irish constitution was sometimes more strongly influenced by
British principles of governance than more modern constitutional
ideals found in the United States. Without understanding the

political context surrounding the birth of the Irish Constitution,
neither the current role of the Constitution in Irish law nor the
particular balance the Constitution strikes as to freedom of the
press makes sense, at least from the perspective of American
constitutionalism.
The history of the modern Irish state began with the Easter
Rising of 1916, in which a small band of rebels occupied the
O'Connell Street General Post Office in the heart of Dublin and
fought off British forces for several days before they were
captured. 2 6 Most of the leaders of the uprising were shot

23.

See JOHN OBIERNE RANELAGH, A SHORT HISTORY OF IRELAND 182-200

(1983) (discussing the uprising that resulted in the creation of the Irish Free
State).
24.
For example, suspicion is perhaps an important reason why Ireland
has abolished the death penalty.
25.
See RANELAGH, supra note 23, at 2 10.
26.
See AODOGAN 0' RAHILLY, WINDING THE CLOCK: ORAI-IILLY AND THE 1916
RISING 207-25 (1991). For a contemporary poet's reaction to the Easter Rising see
WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Easter 1916, in SELECTED POEMS AND THREE PLAYS 83, 83-85
(M. L. Rosenthal ed., 1986). For an account of the events leading to the rising, as
well as the rising itself and its aftermath, see RANELAGH, supranote 23, at 175-85.
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immediately afterwards, without trials, and outrage at their
treatment by the British renewed popular interest in Irish
independence. 27 Although a military failure, the uprising marked
the beginning of a war that would end in late 1921 with the
signing of a peace treaty between Great Britain and Ireland. 28 The
Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and
Ireland declared the existence of an Irish Free State that had "the
same constitutional status . . . as the Dominion of Canada, the
Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and
the Union of South Africa." 2 9 The Treaty provided for a right to
full internal governance, a military force, and international status
as an independent state.3 0 The Treaty also provided that a
provisional government would govern Ireland until December 16,
1922, when a new constitution of the Irish free state, confirmed
by the British Parliament, would take effect. 3 '
The Treaty barely passed in Ddil 1ireann, the Irish Parliament
whose members had been elected in 1920 through electoral
machinery put in place by an act of the British Parliament that
same year.3 2 Those who opposed the Treaty, led by Eamon de
Valera, did so on the grounds that it provided peace at the
expense of a united Ireland, since the-counties of Northern
Ireland were allowed to vote to remain British.3 3 Civil war ensued
in the south of Ireland, during which the majority government,

consisting of Fine Gael party members and led by Michael Collins,
drafted the Constitution of the Irish Free State.3 4 Great Britain
was consulted during the drafting, and in fact required some of
the more republican 3 5 provisions to be altered.3 6 Although Collins

27.
See CASEY, supranote 16, at 4.
28.
See id. at 5.
29.
ANGELA CLIFFORD, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF EIRE/IRELAND 27
(1985) (quoting Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and
Ireland, 1922).
30.
See CASEY, supra note 16, at 6 (citing LEO COHN, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE IRISH FREE STATE 50 (1932)).

31.
32.
33.
34.

See id at 7-8.
See id. at 5-6. The vote was 64-57. See id. at 6.
See id. at 8.
See id.

35.

"Republican" refers, in this context, to Irish movements advocating

Irish unity, i.e., the union of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland in the
South. See RANELAGH, supra note 23, at 211. Therefore, De Valera's Fianna Fdil
party, formed in the waning days of the Civil War and composed of those who
opposed the Treaty, is referred to as Republican. See JOHN BOWMAN, DE VALERA
AND THE ULSTER QUESTION 1917-1973, at 93-95 (1982). During the Civil War this
party called itself the I.R.A. (Irish Republican Army) party, since it remained
committed to Irish independence it saw as incomplete. See RANELAGH, supra note
23, at 190-294 (discussing the formation of the I.R.A.).
36.
See CASEY, supra note 16, at 87. A committee of nine men, chaired by
Michael Collins, who was also serving as Chair of the Provisional Government and
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and his colleagues had intended the Irish Free State to be
unconditionally autonomous, with no remaining obligations to
Britain, the Constitution adopted in 1922 contained an oath to
the Crown and procedural provisions appropriate for a
37
commonwealth.
In addition to concern that Great Britain would not ratify the
1922 Constitution, the framers had another incentive to temper
the republican influence upon the document: the Fine Gael
government feared that any hopes of Northern Ireland joining the
Free State would be dashed ff the language offended the majority
of Protestants in the North.3 8 At the same time, the Fine Gael
government faced pressure from Fianna Fail criticisms that the
Constitution was likely only to further demonstrate the State's
3 9
continued dependence on Great Britain.
The 1922 Constitution did enumerate certain fundamental
rights, including: trial "in due course of law," jury trial for serious
criminal offenses, a habeas corpus provision, inviolability of one's

dwelling, freedom of conscience and religious belief, and a right to
free primary education. 4 ° Article 9 guaranteed freedom of
expression, assembly and association, but subjected these
41
freedoms to 'regulating" statutes.
None of these rights was enforced, however, since judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes was nonexistent under
the 1922 Constitution. 42 This lack of judicial review was due in
part to the fact that the Constitution contained a free amendment
clause that provided for constitutional amendment through the
same procedure as ordinary legislation. 4 3 Thus, the Irish
Parliament, the Oireachtas,could easily render moot a ruling of
unconstitutionality by amending the Constitution." Although the

Minister of Finance to the Dai4 was given the task of drafting the document. Brian
Farrell, The Drafting of the Irish Free State Constitution: I, 5 IRISH JURIST 115, 117
(1970). Among those most involved were Hugh Kennedy, later Attorney General
and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, James Douglas, a young Quaker
republican, and C.J. France, an American lawyer affiliated with a U.S.-based
republican organization. See id. at 117-18.
37.
See Farrell, supra note 36, at 127-31; CASEY, supranote 16, at 9.
38.
See, e.g., Farrell, supranote 36, at 121-22 & n.30.
39.
See id. at 125. Collins wished the Constitution to be as simple as
possible, with minimal references to the Crown, in order to "give answer" to De
Valera's accusations. See id.
40.
CASEY, supra note 16, at 12-13.
41.
See id- at 13.
42.
See icL at 12.
43.
See id. at 13.
44.
See id. The heart of English constitutionalism is the superior power of
Parliament over all other sources of law. See id. See also BETH, supranote 22, at 7
(discussing the new Constitution and parliamentary emphasis).
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free amendment clause was to expire after eight years, it was
indefinitely extended." The effect of the clause was that any bill
in conflict with the Constitution was simply to be regarded as a
constitutional amendment. 4 6
The lack of judicial review could also be attributed to the fact
that judges, who had been trained in the English system,
continued to judge as though Parliament, rather than the
Constitution, was the supreme authority. 4 7 Judges were Irishborn, but educated in England, 4 8 usually conservative, 4 9 and
often Protestant.5" Not surprisingly, Irish independence did not
signal the end or even the decline of English common law in
Ireland. Irish judges today refer often to English common law, and
even to recent English decisions. Unless Irish law or the
Constitution has specifically refused to adopt a rule, all common
law is presumed to have survived Ireland's break from Britain. s
In a judicial system where common law and the legislature reign
supreme, there is little room for the development of constitutional
judicial review.
45.
See CASEY, supranote 16, at 13.
46.
See id.
47.
See BETH, supra note 22, at 4. It is interesting to note that scholars
disagree on to what extent the later 1937 Constitution was meant to preserve the
supremacy of the legislature. Casey claims that even the 1922 Constitution
"plainly rejected" the British doctrine of sovereignty of parliament. CASEY, supra
note 16, at 12. Beth, on the other hand, claims that "[t]here is little doubtf that
the Bunreacht "was intended to embody this principle" of parliamentary
supremacy, despite the new addition of a Bill of Rights. BETH, supranote 22, at 7.
48.
For an account of the poor state of legal education in Ireland in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see J.F. McEldowney & Paul O Higgins, The
Common Law Tradition in Irish Legal History, in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
ESSAYS IN IRISH LEGAL HISTORY 13, 15-16 (J.F. McEldowney & Paul O'Higgins eds.,
1990).
49.
See CASEY, supranote 16, at 13. See also BETH, sUpra note 22, at 6-7
("Judicial attitudes the world over are notoriously conservative, especially on
matters involving the judiciary itself. This has been a particularly pronounced
tendency of common law judges. .. ."). Beth suggested in 1967 that despite legal
realist criticism, in the last two hundred years the common law tradition had
increasingly encouraged a reluctance to engage in creative jurisprudence which
amounted to "judicial eunuchism." Id. But see Kevin Myers, An Irishman's Diary,
IRISH TIMES, Feb. 19, 1998, at 19, available in 1998 WL 6227212 (criticizing the
authoritarian judicial "tampering" with the Constitution in order to curtail
freedom of the press: "As the stars of the bishops of the old order wane in our
night skies, a new stellar episcopacy rises to replace them, bearing not mitres but
wigs, not croziers but staffs. Believe me, they will be no more clement than the
last lot, and probably a damned sight more pompous .... ").
50.
See BETH, supranote 22, at 17.
51.
See, e.g., Corway v. Independent Newspapers (IRE), Ltd., [1996] 1
I.L.R.M. 432, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, IRECAS File. ("It is safe to
assume the that the Oireachtas [the DAi1] considered that the common law
offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel would have been carried over under
the Constitution as not being inconsistent with it.").

1999]

LIBERTY OFEXPRESSION IV RLAND

Nor did judicial conservation and exaltation of common law
end with the repeal of the 1922 Constitution in 1937.52 In 1932,
the Fianna Fdil party, though defeated in the Civil War, won
control of the Ddil through general election.5 3 Eamonn de Valera,
leader of F/annaFdil, became Prime Minister, Taoiseach, and the
party's first act was to introduce the Constitution (Removal of
Oath) Bill.Y4 For de Valera, the 1922 Constitution represented a
concession to British rale, and by 1935 he had decided to destroy
it completely. 55 De Valera had the clout both to declare to the
public that a new constitution was to be drafted and to control
every element of the drafting process.5 6 The committee appointed
for this purpose was made
up of his own civil service employees,
57
rather than ministers.
The constitution adopted in 1937 and still in effect today, the
Bunreacht na hlireann, contains stronger provisions describing
personal rights and an expanded power of the courts to review
legislation for constitutionality.5 8 The American influence on this
language is considerably more visible than it was in the 1922
constitution.5 9 Articles 40 to 44 of Bunreacht na h ireann make
up the section entitled Fundamental Rights. 60 Among the rights
guaranteed are inviolability of the dwelling, freedom of association
61
and assembly, property rights, and freedom of religion.
Provisions in other sections guarantee criminal rights, and voting
rights. 6 2 Freedom of expression is contained in Article 40.6. 1.i:
The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights,
subject to public order and morality:
i. The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and

opinions.
The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such
grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavour to
ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the press,
the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression,
including criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to
undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State.

52.
See CASEY, supra note 16, at 19-20.
53.
See id. at 15.
54.
See id. at 15-16.
55.
See Ronan Fanning, Mr. de Valera Drafts a Constitution, in DE VALERA'S
CONSTITUTION AND OURS 33, 35 (Brian Farrell ed., 1988).
56.
See id. at 36.
57.
See id. at 39.
58.
See BETH, supranote 22, at 4; J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 671
(Gerald Hogan & Gerry Whyte eds., 3d ed. 1994).
59.
See BETH, supra note 22, at 1.
60.
See KELLY, supra note 58, at 671.
61.
See CASEY, supranote 16, at 309.
62.
See id.
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The publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or

indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in
accordance with law.

63

This provision clearly guarantees some right of free speech,
although perhaps not an absolute right." Yet, there is little

judicial interpretation of this passage. Freedom of expression,
especially as it may be affected by current libel law, is not a well6S
developed judicial concept.
This dearth of interpretation is not due to a lack of
constitutional language to authorize judicial review. In fact, the
passage providing for judicial review in the Bunreacht is
unambiguous. Article 34.3.2 states:
Save as otherwise provided in this Article, the jurisdiction of the
High Court shall extend to the question of the validity of any law
having regard to the provisions of this Constitution, and no such
question shall be raised (whether by pleading, argument or
otherwise) in any Court established under this or any other Article
of this Constitution other than the High Court or Supreme
Court. 6 6

In addition, Article 34.4.4 forbids laws to be excepted from
judicial review. 67 And in a provision unlike any in the older
Constitution, the President of Ireland is empowered to refer any
constitutionally questionable statute to the Supreme Court for
review.68

63.

IR. CONST. art. 40.6. li.

64.

In fact, the Supreme Court decided in 1965 in Ryan v. Attorney

General that no personal right is absolute. See KELLY, supra note 58, at 686
(citing Ryan v. Attorney Gen., [1965] I.R. 294).
65.
See, e.g., Nial Fennelly, The Irish Constitution and Freedom of
Expression, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL

LAW 185 (Dierdre Curtin & David O'Keeffe eds., 1992).
66.
IR. CONST. art. 34.4.2.
67.
See icL art. 34.4.4.
68.
See id. art. 26.1. The Provision states:
The President may, after consultation with the Council of State, refer any
Bill to which this Article applies to the Supreme Court for a decision on
the question as to whether such Bill or any specified provision or
provisions of such Bill is or are repugnant to this Constitution or to any
provision thereof.
Id. It is noteworthy that the review provided above is not prompted by an affected
individual's challenge, and therefore is performed without a fact setting. At least
one scholar finds this type of review insufficient as a result, especially since
Article 34.3.3 forbids any later judicial review once a statute has been reviewed
subject to Presidential referral. See BETH, supra note 22, at 5. Beth is similarly
troubled by the condition in Articles 26.2.2 and 34.4.5 that no dissenting or
concurring opinions may be published in constitutional review cases. Id. See also
CASEY, supranote 16, at 267-7 1.
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Despite the inclusion of these provisions for fundamental
rights and judicial review, which were obvious influences of the
U.S. Constitution, the Bunreacht contained other elements which
tended to undermine these provisions. Notably, Article 46 allows

amendment of the Constitution by legislation passed by both
houses of the Oireachtasafter a majority vote by referendum. 69 In
addition, an amendment passed in 1941 provides that whenever
the Supreme Court decides the constitutionality of a statute, it
publishes and acknowledges only a majority opinion, and no
70
concurring or dissenting opinions.
These provisions reflect de Valera's purpose in enumerating
individual rights: their inclusion was meant to signify "primarily
... a statement of the powers of the legislature. " 7 1 They were to
be mere "headlines to the legislature," according to a statement de
Valera made during debate over his draft in the DdiL7 2 In fact,
scholars have wondered why he included the judicial review
provision at all, 7 s as he believed courts had no power to interfere
should the Oireachtasneglect to uphold a constitutional right.7 4
So in a fundamental sense, de Valera had little interest in
enforcing individual rights. His purpose in drafting a new
constitution was not the creation of an innovative rights-based
constitutional state. He viewed the new Constitution as the
ending of an old regime more than the beginning to of new one. 75
His "designs had less to do with inaugurating a brave new world
than with bringing an old and-from de Valera's perspectivedesperately unhappy world to a close."7 6 In addition, in drafting

69.

See Thomas A. Finlay, The Constitutionof Ireland in a Changing Society,

in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAV, supra

note 65, at 137, 137.
70.
See id. at 138.
71.
BETH, supranote 22, at 6. See also KELLY, supranote 58, at 16-17.
72.
KELLY, supra note 58, at 671 (quoting 68 Ddil Debates 2167 (June
1937)). De Valera continued, "I think the Legislature ought to be enabled in its
own judgment to decide [what the public interest consists in] and not the courts
....
The Legislature has the responsibility... of seeing, in the passing of its
laws, that the rights of the individual ... and the rights of the community... do
not conflict and are properly coordinated." Id. (quoting 68 Dail Debates 2167
(June 1937)).
73.
See BETH, supra note 22, at 4. Beth confesses that he cannot answer
the question, but suggests that it may be that it followed naturally in a written
constitution, influenced by the memory of past British abuses, and the examples
of America, Australia, and Canada. See id. at 6.
74.
See KELLY, supra note 58, at 671 (citing de Valera's response to this
issue during the Ddil debate on adopting the Constitution).
75.
See Fanning, supranote 55, at 33-34.
76.
Id. at 34. Some have noted that de Valera's distrust of things British
was in some respects itself the source of the failure of the Irish Constitution to
break away from Ireland's British legal heritage. See BETH, supra note 22, at 5.
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the 1937 Constitution, de Valera was influenced by pro-Catholic
pressures as well as the need to fashion a cohesive concept of
Irish nationhood that could serve to unite the Irish people. 7 7 The
bitter Civil War was still a fresh memory, and to a large extent
Ireland remained divided into two political camps. 78 De Valera
was sensitive to the fact that he himself had been unwilling to
recognize the Irish government in the past, and that the
legitimacy and independence of the Irish state could not be taken
for granted. 7 9 The Constitution was meant to assert once again,
and finally, that Ireland was a viable political state, independent
of Great Britain. 80 But although de Valera was addressing real
needs of Ireland at the time, his focus on asserting separateness
may actually have assured that the resulting document describes
a state that could only understand itself in relation to its former
oppressor-a state not yet ready to develop its own unique
approach to governance. 8 1 Some have suggested that while the
U.S. Constitution by its language creates a state and a set of
supreme laws, the Irish Constitution, rather than being
performative, is a diplomatic or rhetorical instrument meant to
82
convey a statement about Irish statehood.
Thus, while the language of Bunreacht na hEireann declared
more extensive personal rights than its predecessor, and contained a
For instance, he apparently was reluctant to give Irish courts much power
because he saw them as survivors of English rule which would only enforce the
English status quo, and he intended to institute at a later point an entirely
different court system. See id. This new system was formed only in 1961. See id.
77.
See Fanning, supra note 55, at 40-43. The Catholic influences on the
Irish Constitution have been discussed at length by others, and are not crucial to
an understanding of defamation law and judicial review in Ireland. Suffice it to
say that de Valera's Constitution fell just short of declaring that the Catholic
Church is the one true Church, and authority to govern is seen as flowing from
God, through the People, to their elected officials. See id. at 40-41; IR. CONST.
pmbl. In addition, Catholicism served as an important unifier for the Irish, since
under the British oppression had often been specifically anti-Catholic, and
therefore for the Irish, Catholicism was an integral part of their national identity

and their new liberty, just as Israel felt itself free at last to become a Jewish
religious state. See Fanning, supra note 55, at 42 (discussing the importance of
the Catholic Church to unite a divided people).
78.
See Fanning, supranote 55, at 42.

79.

See id. at 40-43.

80.
See id. at 42-43.
81.
Fanning suggests that it is a testament to the success of the
Constitution that de Valera's concerns regarding the legitimacy of the Irish State
now seem rather dated, since now the Irish do take nationhood for granted. See
id. at 44.

82. See, e.g., Peter Sutherland, Twin Perspectives: An Attorney General
Views Politicaland EuropeanDimensions, in DE VALERA'S CONSTITUTION AND OURS,
supranote 55, at 174 (quoting John Kelly, The Constitution:Law and Manifesto, 35
209 (1988)) ("[Ihe Constitution was conceived in part as a
manifesto rather than as bare law.").
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strengthened judicial review provision, it nevertheless reflected a
continued Irish ambivalence to written constitutionalism and
fundamental rights jurisprudence. An early Supreme Court case
predating the Bunreach; The State (Ryan) v. Lennon, addressed this
ambivalence.8 3 The three justices struggled over whether certain
unenumerated rights are so fundamental that they cannot be
abridged by the Oireachtas through amendment.8 4 The majority
adopted the positivist view that the Court has the jurisdiction to
recognize only those rights to which the Constitution gives
expression.8 5 Chief Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing the natural
law position that divine law trumps human law, and therefore the
Oireachtas had exceeded its authority in gutting fundamental
criminal provisions of the Constitution through ordinary legislative
86
procedure.
The net effect of the absence of judicial interpretation of the
Bunreacht was that common law (and legislative statutes)
continued to act as the supreme authority for determining the
legal rights and obligations of Irish citizens. Likewise, the Irish
courts' initial strict adherence to precedent contributed to the
continued primacy of English common law. The courts adopted
the House of Lords rule that even the Supreme Court must abide
87
by its own previous decisions.
In sum, the Bunreachtwas framed in a context of "American"
influences such as written constitutionalism, enumerated
fundamental rights, and a power of judicial review on the one
hand, and "English" influences such as the supremacy of
Parliament over the constitution and courts, and a strong

common law tradition maintained by a naturally conservative,
English-educated judiciary on the other side. In addition, the
attempt to fashion a uniquely Catholic modem state drew much
of the attention and imagination of those responsible for shaping
Ireland's constitutionalism."8 De Valera's new constitution,
Bunreacht na hlireann, was therefore unlikely to herald any
radical legal shift away from English constitutional and common
law principles. This English conservatism
and general
ambivalence toward an American notion of individual rights
remain distinguishing characteristics of Irish jurisprudence, and
83.
KELLY, supranote 58, at 672 (citing The State (Ryan) v. Lennon [1935]
I.R. 170).
84.
See id.
85.
See id. at 672 (citing The State (Ryan) v. Lennon [1935] I.R. 170
(Fitzgibbon, J., concurring)).
86.
See id at 673.
87.
See BTH, supranote 22, at 9.
88.
See id. at 2.
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as a result, the Supreme Court has hesitated to review the
constitutionality of the law of defamation.

III. CURRENT IRISH DEFAMATION LAW AND ITS EFFECTS

ON FREE EXPRESSION
Before discussing what constitutional review of defamation
would or should look like, it is necessary to understand current
defamation law, and how it is damaging to free speech.
A. Irish Law of Defamation
1. The Origins of Irish Defamation Law
Before the Republic of Ireland won its independence in 1921,
Irish courts applied the common law of England, and jurists
generally believed that they had achieved uniformity with England
as regards the law of defamation. 8 9 In fact, despite this
"predominant and almost embarrassing desire"90 to conform to
English law, Irish law and practice was somewhat distinctive,
especially in procedure. 9 1 Nevertheless, Irish civil defamation law,
both common law and statute, is very similar to English common
law, and is often distinguished only in its tendency to maintain

traditional common law with greater vigor. 92 The main statute
governing defamation is the Defamation Act (1961), which alters
the common law in limited areas. 9 3 English and Irish sources
have sometimes defended the common law as sufficiently
protective of free expression, but the common law does not
contain any explicit mechanisms for upholding the right of free
94
expression, and thus provides little protection.

89.
See MARc McDONALD, IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION 1-2 (1987) [hereinafter
IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION]. For instance, one Irish judge stated in 1874: "The law
of libel in England and the law of libel in Ireland are the same-the same in
principle and in practice." Id. (quoting Stannus v. Finlay [1874] I.R. 8 CL 264,
290.)
90.
Id. at 2.
91.
See id. The situation may be likened to American states' adoption of
language identical to a federal rule, where over time that language may be
interpreted quite differently in different states.
92.
See id. McDonald notes that often Irish judges clung to an outdated
English common law principle, only to see England reform or eliminate its law
shortly afterwards. See id. To some extent that remains a common pattern even
now in defamation law. See id. at 2-3 & n. 11.
93.
See CASEY, supra note 16, at 461.
94.
See, e.g,, Eoin O'Dell, Does Defamation Value Free Expression? The
Possible Influence of New York Times v. Sullivan on Irish Law, 12 DUBLIN U. L. J.
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Defamation law is traditionally grounded in the idea that a
person's good name is a valuable economic commodity, and when
someone loses her good name, she has suffered an injury not just
to her feelings, but to her livelihood. 9s Monetary damages in libel
and slander suits are meant to compensate9 6 for this very real
injury when it results from false publications.
The civil law of defamation was traditionally judge-made.
With the advent of the new Irish state, this body of law remained
relatively unchanged despite the eventual enactment of the
9
Defamation Act (1961).
7 In the absence of judicial review, the
development of which was stilted by the Supreme Court's
adoption of the rule of precedent, the constitutionality of the
restriction placed on expression by this very traditional body of
law has rarely been questioned. 9 8
2.

Prima Facie Case

Under the common law and the Defamation Act, a plaintiff
must make out the prima facie case that: (1) a statement is
defamatory, (2) it was made of and concerning the plaintiff, and
(3) it was "published" to a third party.9 9 Because an injury to
reputation may be hard to quantify, but nevertheless naturally
follows from certain kinds of accusations, at common law the
presumption in a libel suit is that an injury has been suffered.' 0 0
A plaintiff in a slander suit, on the other hand, must prove actual
damages.10 1 A jury determines whether a plaintiff has proven the
prima facie case and decides upon any defenses presented by the
defendant. 0 2 If the jury finds for the plaintiff, it determines the
03
damages as well.'
Proving a statement is defamatory or has a defamatory effect
is relatively easy; it is said that the law in Ireland "starts from the
premise that the maker of a disparaging statement is liable ....
50, 57 (1990) (quoting the "Spycatcher" case, Attorney Gen. v. Guardian
Newspapers 1 W.L.R. 1248 (1987) (Bridge, L.J., dissenting)) [hereinafter
Defamation Value].
95.
See Marc McDonald, Defamation Reform-A Response to the LRC
Report, 10 IRISH L. TIMES 270, 270-71 (1992) [hereinafter Defamation Reform].
96.
See id. at 271.
97.
See CASEY, supranote 16, at 461.
98.
See id. at 461-65.
99.

See LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE CIVIL LAW OF

DEFAMATION 6 (199 1) [hereinafter COMMISSION PAPER].
100. See id.
101.
Seeid.at36.
102. See BRYAN M.E. MCMAHON & WILLIAM BINCHY, IRISH LAW OF TORTS 63132, 661 (2d ed. 1990).
103. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 172-74.
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[It] starts, therefore, with an easily established and potentially
immense range of liability .
.104
"..
A plaintiff must show that the
astatement tends to lower the person in the eyes of society, or in
the estimation of 'right-thinking members of society generally' or
...

tends to hold that person up to ridicule, hatred, or contempt,

or causes the person to be shunned or avoided."10 5 Defamation is
one of the few civil causes of action in Ireland which is tried
before a jury, precisely because liability depends upon the opinion
of "right-thinking citizens." 1° 6 Unlike civil procedure in the United
States, Irish procedure does not provide for summary judgment.
Instead, a case goes to a jury as soon as a judge determines that
the statement
at issue is "capable" of having a defamatory
10 7
meaning.
Ireland's defamation scheme is one of strict liability: fault or
intent is not relevant to the prima facie case, nor does it
constitute a defense. All that is required in the way of fault is
malice presumed from the making of the defamatory statement,
sometimes called "malice in law."10 8 The use of the word
"maliciously" in a statement of claim is purely a formality. 10 9
3. Defenses
Plaintiffs do not have to prove that a defamatory statement is
false, but if a defendant can prove that the words complained of
are true "in substance and fact" she may invoke the defense of
'justification." 1 10 The law therefore imposes a difficult burden of
proof upon the defendant to persuade the jury through admissible
evidence that the entire defamatory statement is factually true."1
In practice, courts require a high degree of accuracy for this
104.

IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supranote 89, at 6.
105. COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 7 (quoting Sim v. Stetch [1936] 2
All E.R. 1237, 1240 (Lord Atkdn)). The test is an objective one; the intent of the
defamer is irrelevant to whether a statement is defamatory. See id. at 10.
106. Id. at 7.
107. See MCMAHON & BINCHY, supranote 102, at 631-32.
108. See COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 29-30.

109.

See id. at 30.

110. United States common law calls this the defense of "substantial truth."
JOHN WADE ET. AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTs

855 (9th ed. 1994).
111. See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 6. It is difficult to
underestimate the importance of the issue of burden of proof as to a statement's
truth. In the recent English case of McDonald's v. Greenpeace (known as the

McLibel case), the environmentalist defendants were considered to have won a
great victory notwithstanding a verdict and liability, when they were able to prove
in court the truth of four out of seven of the claims they made about McDonald's
food and practices (including one claim that McDonald's marketing exploited
children). See John Vidal, McLibel 2: The Dogged Duo Return with 63 Objections,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 13, 1999, at 10, availablein 1999 WL 5105847.

1999]

LIBERTY OF EXPRESSION IN IRELAND

defense, and journalists in particular have often complained that
the justification defense is seldom available to them because their
sources are unwilling to testify in court.1 1 2 Further, if a defendant
strives too hard to prove the truth of the statement, by
introducing disparaging evidence concerning the plaintiff or
engaging in strenuous cross-examination of the plaintiff, and the
jury remains unconvinced that she has met her burden, she may
actually cause more damage to her case. A jury may award the
plaintiff aggravated damages based on these further attacks on
her character, and no privilege protects the defendant from these
damages. 1 1 3 As a result,4 defendants commonly refrain from
11
attempting this defense.
"Fair comment" is the other important substantive defense
available. To successfully employ this defense, a defendant must
prove that "the words complained of were fair comment on a
matter of public interest."' 1 5 Again, this defense places a heavy
burden on the defendant, who must prove all of the following
elements: 1) the statement consists of comment, 2) the comment
is supported by fact, 3) its subject matter is of public interest, and
4) the comment is "fair."" 6 In addition, the defense is defeated if,
after all these elements are proven, the plaintiff is able to prove
that the statement was motivated by "malice." 17 Malice here
differs from "presumed malice" at issue in the prima facie case-it
is a test referring to publication of a statement actually motivated
by spite or by ulterior motives."18 Fairness is determined by the
See COMMISSION PAPER, supranote 99, at 179.
113. See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supranote 89, at 111-12.
114. See id. at 114-15.
115. COMMISSION PAPER, supranote 99, at 43.
116. Id at 57. Fairness consists of the existence of a logical connection
between the comment and its supporting facts. See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION,

112.

supra note 89, at 209.
117.
See COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 57. The determination of
fairness is an objective test applied before the subjective test of malice. See ic
118.
See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 223-24. Note that in
defamation law, "publication" refers to any communication of a statement to a
third party, whether public or private. See HENRY MURDOCH, A DICTIONARY OF IRISH
LAW 431 (2d ed. 1993).
McDonald may define this kind of malice too narrowly-he says it is the actual
content of the statement that must not be motivated by spite or ill will, and
therefore the dispassionate judgment of a critic who harbors ill will should qualify
for the defense. See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 223-24. It is
doubtful that Irish courts and juries construe malice so narrowly that, once ajury
suspects a wrong or improper motive in the mind of the publisher, they may
disallow the defense. See COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 74-75. In addition,
some courts appear to allow malice to be found where a publisher was motivated
by profit. See id. at 75.
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objective test of whether the comment is one "an honest, albeit
prejudiced, person might make in the circumstances."1 19
The requirement that a "fair comment" be based on facts
proven to be true makes this defense particularly difficult to
establish. The defense of fair comment derives from nineteenth
century courts' unwillingness to apply a qualified privilege to
public comment, under which an untrue statement would
nevertheless be protected as long as it was not made with actual
malice. 12 0 The courts chose to make the fair comment defense
harder to prove by requiring, in addition to malice, proof of the
facts upon which the comment relies.1 2 1 This requirement leads
to lengthy discussions as to the distinction between facts and
comment, and such discussions lead, in turn, to byzantine
formalities in pleading.122 Moreover, courts require the facts
forming the basis for a comment to be expressly stated or
indicated as such in the statement; otherwise, the statement is
treated as an assertion of fact and the defense of fair comment is
inapplicable.123

Whether a matter is of public interest is a question of law, to
be decided by a judge. 124 While there is no agreed-upon definition
of public interest, one authority lists the following subjects as
qualifying for the defense: 1) the public conduct of a public
official, 2) political or state matters, 3) Church matters, 4) the
administration of justice, 5) the management of public
institutions, 6) the administration of local affairs, 7) books,
pictures, works of art, public performances, 8) any place or type
of public entertainment, 9) anything that may be fairly said to
invite comment. 125

119. COMMISSION PAPER, supranote 99, at 57 (citing Chernesky v. Armadale
Publishers, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 321,345 (1978) (Dickson, J., dissenting).
120. For a discussion of qualified privilege defenses, see COMMISSION PAPER,
supra note 99, at 88-103; IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 142-208.
For instance, qualified privileges protect statements made out of legal, and
sometimes moral duties, and in judicial proceedings. See COMMISSION PAPER,
supra note 99, at 88-89.
121.
See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supranote 89, at 213-14.
122.
See COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 59. For example, attorneys
generally plead fair comment as a "rolled up plea": "Insofar as the words
complained of consist of allegations of fact, they are true in substance and in fact,
and insofar as they consist of opinion they are fair comments made in good faith
and without malice upon the said facts, which are matters of public interest." Id.
at 59. Despite its appearance, this plea is not asserting the defense of
justification, it is merely addressing the element of fair comment requiring true
supporting facts. See id. at 59-60.
123.
See id. at 60-61.
124.
Seeid.at71.
125.
See id. at 71-72 (citing LIBEL AND SLANDER 315-24, paras. 732-46 (8th

ed.)).
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In light of the lack-of-malice and supporting-facts
requirements, as well as the relatively narrow conception of public
interest, it is no wonder that the fair comment defense rarely

prevails. And, again, there is a powerful incentive not to even
raise the defense, since a failed attempt to prove the truth of
supporting facts may, like a failed attempt to prove justification,
126
result in aggravated damages.
Section 21 of the Defamation Act of 1961 provides a defense
for unintentional defamation under some conditions.1 2 7 An
innocent (i.e., without malice) defamer may promptly retract the
statement and make an offer of amends with an attached affidavit
explaining the mistake; if the defamed party then refuses the
offer, the defamer may raise a complete defense in a subsequent
suit. 1 2 8 Absence of malice is hard to prove, however, and many

have criticized the number of formalities required for this defense
as overly burdensome. 129
4. Remedies

Compensatory damages are available to a plaintiff according
to the jury's estimation of the extent of actual injury to her
reputation.' 3 0 Although defamation law is premised upon this
reputational injury, compensatory damages may also include
compensation for emotional distress.' 3 ' Plaintiffs in libel cases
have assumed damages; they need not prove their injury, and a
showing of actual damages will not increase compensation.' 3 2 In
addition, "aggravated compensatory damages" may be awarded for
further injury to the plaintiffs feelings and dignity caused by
particularly offensive conduct by the defendant during the course
of a trial, whether inside or outside the courtroom. 1 3 Aggravated

126.
See id. at 62.
127.
See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 229-30; COMMISSION
PAPER, supranote 99, at 104-06.
128.
See id.
129.
See IRISH LAiW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 231-33; COMMISSION
PAPER, supra note 99, at 106-07. It may be difficult to prepare the affidavit on
time, for instance. See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 231.
130.
See id. at 240.
131.
See id.
132.
See id. at 241-42.
133.
See id. at 240-41. See also COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 11617. Conduct affecting aggravated damages includes conduct at trial, as when a
defendant fails in an attempt to prove justification or supported facts, discussed
above, or the bad reputation of the plaintiff for damages purposes-a particularly
harsh rule for defendants. See id. at 117. Conduct may also include statements to
the press, etc. For instance, during a recent libel case, De Rossa v. Irish
Independent, comments made on a radio show by the journalist who first wrote
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compensatory damages are considered distinct from punitive
damages, but in practice this line becomes hazy. 134 Punitive

damages are somewhat controversial, and are reserved for
exceptional cases. 135 Nominal damages are available where3 6a
plaintiff seeks not compensation, but a declaratory judgement. 1
Juries receive little guidance as to the amount of damages to
award. 137 An important factor in determining damages is the
"character, reputation, and position of a plaintiff."' 3 8 While
plaintiffs are presumed to have good reputations, evidence of a
plaintiffs prominence may convince a jury to award greater
damages.139 Proving bad character, however, is one of the
avenues available to the defendant for mitigation of damages.140 A
defendant may appeal a jury award on grounds of excessive
damages; however, juries have wide discretion in this area and
courts are reluctant to upset a verdict.14 1 Generally damages are
the
reduced only where a court finds that they are "perverse,"
14 2
result of a "gross blunder," or "unreasonably large."
B. A Typical Case: Campbell-Sharp v. Independent

Newspapers (RE)
Campbell-Sharp v. Independent Newspapers'43 is in many
ways a typical Irish libel case. The plaintiff is a public figure-she
is known as a media mogul and a socialite. The defendant is an
Irish newspaper. The source of the claim is an accusation which,
although possibly defamatory, seems relatively trivial, yet the
damages awarded are very high. The case therefore provides a
useful illustration of how Irish courts generally deal with
defamation suits. In addition, the case demonstrates how
decisions that seem somewhat unwise yet not outrageous begin to
have a cumulative invidious effect upon freedom of expression.
the statement at issue subjected him not only to aggravated damages, but also to
a contempt of court action. Marie OTalloran, Dunphy Must Attend High Courtfor
Contempt Hearing, IRISH TiMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at 7, available in 1997 WL
12016966.
134.
See COMMISSION PAPER, supranote 99, at 116.
135.
See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supranote 89, at 241.
136.
See id.
137.
See id. at 242, 244-45.
138.
Id. at 246 (quoting Barrett, C.J., in Barret v. Independent Newspapers,
S.Ct., unreported, Mar. 12, 1986).
139.
See id. at 246-47.

140.

See COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 117-118.

141.
142.
143.

See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supranote 89, at 243.
Id. at 244.
No. 5557 (Ir. H. Ct. May 6, 1997).
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In April of 1992, Hugh Leonard's weekly column, "Leonard's
Log," appeared in the Sunday Independent. 1 " As usual, Leonard
had written daily journal entries of light criticism and gossip
about theater and entertainment, along with various personal
comments and anecdotes. Campbell-Sharp objected to the
following passage:
Thursday
A lady telephoned on behalf of Noelle Campbell-Sharp and asks if

I should be gracing "Phil the Fluthers" Ball in Killarney. It is only a
few months since ... Ms. Campbell-Sharp's publishing company
went to the wall owing me £5,000.00 for services rendered.
The lady did not call then with her commiserations or to ask me
if I was in need of a crust. But I am glad to see that she herself to
no-one's surprise avoided the workhouse. I hope she will forgive
my not attending the Kerry Ball. To use an expression much in
14
vogue across the Atlantic, I gave at the office.

Leonard was referring to an agreement he had signed after
negotiations with Noelle Campbell-Sharp, in which he was
commissioned to write several pieces on Irish hotels and

restaurants for a travel book. 14 Campbell-Sharp was a prominent
businesswoman, as well as a flamboyant public figure in Ireland
in the 1980s, known for her ostentatious lifestyle, her extravagant
parties, and her business sense. 14 7 Her chief claim to fame,
however, was her ownership of Irish Tatler (IT), Ireland's leading
beauty magazine, through her publishing company, Irish Tatler
Publications Limited. 1 8 Leonard was never paid for his articles,
as the publishing company that had bought out the Irish Tatler
became insolvent. 149
The gist of Leonard's passage was that someone who had
claimed to be calling on Campbell-Sharp's behalf had tried to sell
Leonard an expensive ticket to a charity ball that Campbell-Sharp

144.
See Plaintiff's Statement of Claim (Sept.28, 1992), Pleadings at 6,
Campbell-Sharp (No. 5557).
145.
Id. at 7 (quoting Hugh Leonard, Leonard's Log, IRISH INDEP., Apr. 26,
1992, at 3L). A statement of claim is equivalent to a complaint in the United
States.
146.
Transcript of Jury Action (Apr. 29, 1997), at 7-9, Campbell-Sharp (No.
5557).
147.
See, e.g., Liam Fay, Deceiving to Flatter, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov.
29, 1998, at 30, availablein 1998 WL 21855516.

148. Campbell-Sharp's celebrity in Ireland is similar in different ways to
that of both Helen Gurley-Brown (former editor of Cosmopolitan) and Donald
Trump. See, for example, Fay, supra note 147, at 30, for an account of a radio
interview with Mrs. Campbell-Sharp in which she expresses her admiration for
Napoleon and for the corrupt Irish politician Charles Haughey.

149.

See Plaintiff's Statement of Claim (Sept. 28, 1992), Pleadings at 10-11,

Campbell-Sharp(No. 5557).

412

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:391

was organizing. Leonard commented that in light of the debt he
was owed, which he was unlikely to recover, he had already made
a sort of charity donation to Campbell-Sharp.
Leonard was wrong in one important regard: at the time he had
agreed to write the travel pieces, Campbell-Sharp had just sold her
publishing company to Robert Maxwell, a British publishing
magnate, and she was serving only as company director, not
owner.1 5 0
The Maxwell
Group declared
insolvency soon
afterwards. 15 1 It was not technically Campbell-Sharp, therefore, who
owed a debt to Leonard, but the insolvent Maxwell Group.
In her pleading, Campbell-Sharp contended that Leonard had
accused her of being "a selfish and/or dishonourable person,
uncaring for the welfare of a person who had rendered his service
15 2
to her publishing company for which she had not paid him."
Leonard was liable for such an accusation she contended, and the
Sunday Independent was liable for knowingly publishing the
statement in an attempt to profit from it.1 53
Leonard and Independent Newspapers (IRE) Ltd. responded
in pleadings that the statement was not defamatory.1 5 4 They also
raised the defense of justification-that the statement was "true
in substance and in fact," and in the alternative, the defense of
fair comment-that the statement constitutes commentary on a
matter of public interest, supported by true facts, and made in
good faith without malice.1 5 5 The defendants also stated, for
purposes of mitigation of damages, that Campbell-Sharp had
suffered no injury and that they had published the statement
15 6
without actual malice.
At trial, Campbell-Sharp's barristers emphasized malice; they
argued that Leonard must have known that Maxwell had bought out
IT, because the transaction was reported in the Irish Independent
when it occurred.15 7 Furthermore, Leonard knew from signing his
contract that Campbell-Sharp was no longer in charge of the
company.15 8 Leonard was depicted as a sophisticated reviewer of
culture who wined and dined throughout France at others'

150. See id. at 8.
151. See id. at 11.
152. Id. at 7.
153. See id. at 7-8.
154. Defendant's Defence (Feb. 5, 1993), Pleadings at 14, Campbell-Sharp
(No. 5557). A "defence" is the equivalent of an answer to a complaint in the United
States.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 15.
157. See Transcript of Jury Action (Apr. 29, 1997), at 5-6, Campbell-Sharp
(No. 5557).
158. Seeid. at9-11.
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expense.1 5 9 Campbell-Sharp's attorneys portrayed her as grieving yet
powerless to act as she watched the company she had once owned

fall into mismanagement and financial troubles. 160 The thrust of the
plaintiffs case centered, then, not on liability, but on the proper
amount of damages. The plaintiff's attorneys argued that malice

existed because the defendant knew that the statement was untrue.
Her attorney's emphasized the weight of the injury to CampbellSharp's good name, and they sought general sympathy for their
client. 16 1 In addition, the lawyers' emphasis on blameworthiness
probably encouraged jurors to find Leonard liable although fault
should be irrelevant to this determination.
After both sides had finished presenting evidence, Mr. Clarke,
representing the defendants, and Mr. Mackey, representing the
plaintiff, debated at length as to whether the defenses of
justification and fair comment, as well as aggravated damages
162
and punitive damages, should be allowed to go to the jury.
Plaintiff's arguments against instructing the jury on the fair
comment defense conflated the question of intent, legally relevant
only to damages, with a determination of public interest. Mackey
argued that Leonard's testimony that he was motivated to write
the article because he found Campbell-Sharp's invitation
"cheeky," undercut the defense's argument that the article was of
public interest. 163 The court accepted Mackey's argument that the
defense of fair comment failed for lack of public interest.164
The court reluctantly allowed the jury to consider the defense of
justification, a defense which rested on the theory that reasonable
readers of the Sunday Independent might understand 'her company"
to mean merely that Campbell-Sharp was "intimately connected"
with the company. 165 Here the court blurred the distinction between
subjective considerations of perception and objective considerations
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 6-7.
See icL at 12.
In his opening statement for the plaintiff, Mr. Mackey began discussing

damages on what became the third page of a thirty-plus page statement, when
transcribed. See id. at 6. Throughout the statement, Mackey asked the jury to
imagine Campbell-Sharp's feelings upon reading the article. See id. at 14. In fact,
in the guise of clearing up a confusion in pleadings, Mackey went on to read
excerpts from defendants' counsel's correspondence to plaintiff's counsel, in order
to excite animus against the defendant. See id. at 20. For instance, he denounced
one excerpt: "Your letter does not identify any inaccuracy in the article . . .", as

"one of the most hypocritical letters that has ever been written in a libel
case. .. ." Id.

162. Transcript of Evidence of Action (May 6, 1997), at 3-17, CampbellSharp (No. 5557).
163. See id.at 7.
164. See id.at 27.
165.

See i. at 8, 13.
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of truth: for the purposes of the justification defense, words must be
true in their ordiay meaning.166 The jury must determine what a

reasonable reader would understand words to mean, so questions of
truth collapse back into perception. Yet Justice Geoghegan pointed
out that objectively speaking, a corporation is its own entity and can
belong to no one. 16 7 "[Her company" can be neither true nor false,
because it is nonsense in a legal sense.1 6 8 Thus, the entire basis of
Campbell-Sharp's claim that she was falsely defamed rests on the
factual falsity of a statement which has no meaning. Nevertheless,
the judge instructed the jury that they were to consider what
16 9
meaning the ordinary reader would impute to the statement.
Plaintiffs counsel succeeded in submitting the question of
aggravated compensatory damages, which arise under Irish law
when a defendant has been accused of having defamed the plaintiff
further before or during trial. 17 0 During the course of the trial, the
Sunday Independent had published articles summing up the
testimony of key witnesses; the tone of the articles was at times
sarcastic or mocking of Campbell-Sharp. 1 7 ' The judge instructed the
jury to award additional damages for Campbell-Sharp's added hurt
and distress, if the articles made such comments "wrongfully." 172
After deliberating for about an hour and a half, the jury
($100,562) in "ordinary" compensatory
awarded £70,000
damages, and none in aggravated damages. 173 In addition,
because she won, Campbell-Sharp was entitled to "costs," which
in Ireland includes attorney's fees. 17 4 Attorneys for the defense
estimate their clients' total liability at £200,000 ($287,320).17s

166.
167.
168.
company,
169.

170.

See, e.g., id. at 34 (Justice Geoghegan's charge to the jury).
See icl.at 12-13.
See id Justice Geoghegan noted that a "person cannot own a
they can only own shares in the company." Id. at 12.
Seeid.at4l.

See COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 116 for a description of

aggravated compensatory damages.
171.

See Transcript of Evidence of Action (flay 6, 1997), at 59, Campbell-

Sharp (No. 5557).
172.
See id. at 60.
173.
See ic. at 61, 64.
See id. at 64-65, 72 (defense counsel acknowledging entitlement to
174.
costs, but later arguing that one witness for the defense had constituted an

unnecessary cost).
175. See Letter from Michael Kealey, to author, supra note 10. The SUNDAY
INDEPENDENT'S appeal of the award was later dismissed by the Supreme Court.
Campbell-Sharpe (sic)Libel Case Lawyers Forced to Cut Legal Fees Further,IRISH
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 24529687. Campbell-Sharp's
lawyers submitted a bill for costs of £350,000 but the Taxing Master reduced the
figure to £244,391 and then later adjusted the brief fees bringing the total costs
down to £212,591. See id.
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C. Defamation Law's Effect on Freedom of Expression
Campbell-Sharp v. Independent Newspapers (IRE), Ltd. is not
an unusual defamation case, nor does it involve a record-breaking
judgment, although Campbell-Sharp did win a very high award.
What is striking about the case, and its disposition, is how so
much can have been made out of so little. From the perspective of
American defamation law, the fact that a mundane comment in a
"fluffy" editorial column could be the basis for years of litigation
ending in a judgment of this size seems bizarre, especially in light
of the fact that the statement at issue was only technically false.
Among the problems most apparent from the example of this
case are: 1) the inability of "public interest" to encompass editorial
statements about well-known figures, corporations and other
entities, 2) the problems associated with attempting to parse out
facts from opinions and objective issues from subjective ones, 3)
the related problem of malice, difficult enough for defendants
where it is correctly applied, as to some damages issues and the
defense of public comment, but nearly insurmountable where it
bleeds into consideration of questions in which fault is
supposedly irrelevant, 4) excessive jury awards that seem based
on punishment or emotional hurt rather than compensating
injury to reputation, and 5) the awarding of attorneys' fees to the
winner, which fees, when coupled with excessive jury awards, can
bankrupt publishers and other members of the media with a
single blow.
Excessive and unreasonable defamation liability can affect
freedom of expression in several ways. First, the financial burden of
defending such suits can force media companies out of business. A
second problem is self-censorship by media companies. In an
attempt to ward off liability, newspapers elinimate controversial
comments and discourage investigative reporting. Also, book
publishers hesitate to publish controversial authors, and booksellers
hesitate to stock these authors.1 6 Meanwhile, individual journalists,
writers, and others who inform the public avoid making controversial
comments about public figures, in order to ensure publication and
avoid individual liability. Even private citizens become wary of
speaking out against the government or those with power, money, or
political clout. The result is that less information is available to the
public, and the public is less free to debate the information that is
available. In addition, the public's tolerance for censorship in other

176. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing one bookstore's
importation of Kitty Kelley's controversial book THE RoYALs).

416

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:391

areas grows as they become accustomed to restraining their
expression in order to avoid defamation liability. Those in
government, big business, and others with power, removed from
press scrutiny, are free to engage in corrupt behavior. Finally, a
powerful few become better able to manipulate the public as the
public becomes increasingly ignorant.
The pressures of excessive defamation liability are quite real in
Ireland, and the result is significant self-censorship. The incentives to
sue for libel are strong: liability is easy to achieve, 17 7 awards can be
enormous, and plaintiffs lose little even when their cases do not
prevail. 17 8 Powerful interests routinely use libel threats to control
their publicity. 179 Politicians make up nearly a quarter of all libel
plaintiffs.1 8 0 Irish journalists recount situations where the press has
been unable to expose the truth about corrupt political figures and
businesspeople, either for fear of liability or because they were
enjoined by a court of law. 18 1 Journalists are often advised by

177. About twenty out of one hundred defamation suits against media
defendants go to trial, and the media wins about four of those. See Foley, supra
note 1, at 13.
178. The losing party usually bears all costs in defamation cases. See Irish
Media Label Defamation Practice Unfair, INTL COM. LITIG., July/August 1997, at 4,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. These costs may include
attorney's fees for two senior counsel and one junior counsel, as well as brief fees.
See id. But the chances of success are high enough that plaintiff's attorneys are
often willing to take on clients on a "no-win, no-fee basis," similar to a
contingency fee basis in the United States, so that clients have little to lose in

filing suit. Id.
179. See Fintan OToole, Libel Laws Can Protect Your Good Name or They
Can Be Used To Hide Bad Deeds, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, at 5, available in 1997
WL 12018283. The Irish Times received twenty-five libel threats in 1988, and
seventy in 1996. See i.
180. See Marie McGonagle, Supreme Court Could Seize on De Rossa Case to
Set Guidelines, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 5, 1997, at 5, availablein 1997 WL 12017156.
181. See OToole, supra note 179, at 5. For other journalists' criticism of
libel laws, see Computimes: Could CogairBeSaved?, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at
18, available in 1997 WL 12029125; Carol Coulter, Finance Editor Wins Top
Award, 'Irish Times' Writers Take Three Honours at Media Event, IRISH TIMES, Oct.
18, 1997, at 10, available in 1997 WL 12030713; Ruth Dudley Edwards, A Great
Year for the Virtues of Honesty and Humility, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 4, 1999, at 14,
availablein 1999 WL 6180911 (celebrating the defeat of a defamation suit brought
by Thomas "Slab" Murphy, "a very senior member of the IRA [who] had for many
years bolstered his already healthy finances by suing or threatening to sue
anyone who suggested he was a prosperous smuggler or even a foot-soldier in the
IRA."); Garret Fitzgerald, Opinion, Tribunal Reveals Dangerous Lack of Democratic
Vigilance, IRISH TIMES, July 12, 1997, at 14, available in 1997 WL 12013792
(decrying journalists' cozy relationships with politicians); Mary Holland, Opinion,
Attacks on Media Must Not Deter Them From Doing Job, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997,
at 16, available in 1997 WL 12029125 (blaming libel laws for lackluster
investigative reporting in Ireland, and suggesting that corrupt politicians Ray
Burke and Charles Haughey were exposed only because the stories fell in
journalists' laps); Kevin Myers, Editorial, An Irishman's Diary, IRISH TIMES, Jan.
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counsel to publish apologies for past statements they know are true,
replacing these statements with false information; on occasion,
governmental investigations have subsequently proven journalists
right, but many more misdeeds remain hidden.1 8 2 In one recent and
infamous instance, a journalist was killed for exposing mafia
activity. 18 3 On many other occasions, fear of liability prevents stories
from being published or renders them harmlessly vague.18 4 The size
of the potential liability at stake in any one defamation suit is such

that bankruptcy is a real danger for smaller, and even medium-sized
Irish newspapers.' 8s In addition, some books are not sold new in
86
Ireland because they would expose bookstores to liability.1
Society's lowered expectations of free speech resulting from
libel laws facilitates other governmental efforts to control
expression. For instance, the Minister for Communications is
authorized by law to direct broadcasters not to broadcast "matter
. . . [which] would be likely to promote, or incite to, crime or

22, 1999, at 15, available in 1999 WL 6183837; Kevin Myers, An Irishman'sDiary,
IRISH TIMES, Feb. 6, 1998, at 17, available in 1998 WL 6224856. Kevin Myers,
Editorial, An Irishman'sDiary, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 18, 1997, at 15, available in 1997
WL 12030826 ("We have the least free press in what is called the free world ....
[E]very newspaper in Ireland spends fortunes fighting off libel actions; lawyers
rock with joyous laughter at the very mention of our libel laws."); Opinion, Now Is
the Time to Halt Any Grubby Slide in Our Political System, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 30,
1997, at 14, available in 1997 WL 12022072. But see Opinion, Debate on Libel
Laws Must Cover Press Ownership, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 5, 1997, at 12, available in
1997 WL 12017198 (criticizing the press for "displays of muscle put on from time
to time by powerful newspaper group").
182.
See generally OToole, supra note 179, at 5. O'Toole mentions several
instances. One involved the discovery of Bord Telecom chairman Michael
Smurfit's financial interest in the property his company bought for its
headquarters. See id. Another involves Goodman International's abuse of the
export credit insurance system. See id.
183.
See Aer Lingus Fraud Trial Told of Veronica Guerin Libel Action, IRISH
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at 19, available in 1998 WL 13628148; Kathy Sheridan,
Rivals to Do Battle Over a Reputation Which Cost Veronica Guerin Her Life, IRISH
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1998, at 11, availablein 1998 WL 6238847.

184.

See McGonagle, supranote 180, at 5.

185.
See OToole, supra note 179, at 5. OToole predicts that one large
award would cause the Irish Times "severe difficulties," and likely bankrupt the
Sunday Business Post. Id. Smaller papers' vulnerability may be leading to a
further concentration of power in the larger papers, and less media diversity and
competition. See id. OToole would prefer to replace the current libel laws with a
system of media regulations that encourages professional standards while
supporting free and diverse journalism. See id. See also two articles on threats to
student newspapers, Roddy O'Sullivan, Student Media, IRISH TIMES, Jan, 20, 1999,
at 8, available in 1999 WL 6183350, and Roddy O'Sullivan, Trinity Paper Tries to
Make Its Pride Survive a Fall, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at 8, available in 1999
WL 6183352.
186.
See, e.g., Foley, supranote 14, at 8.
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would tend to undermine the authority of the State ..

."187

In

addition, the Official Secrets Act cloaks all cabinet decisions in
secrecy, and the Freedom of Information Act, only recently
enacted, is weaker legislation than many had hoped.1 8 Contempt
of court is imposed too freely in order to maintain the authority of
the judiciary.1 8 9 For the last fifty-two years Ireland has banned
of conception or the
books advocating the "unnatural prevention
190
procurement of abortion or miscarriage."
In light of the current state of free expression in Ireland, Part
IV of this Note will explore what Irish sources of law, such as the
Constitution, demand in terms of freedom of expression, and,
after discussing some constitutional models, will attempt to
develop an analysis for guiding the reformation of Ireland's
defamation statute.
IV. DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF DEFAMATION

It has been argued that Irish libel laws greatly hamper
freedom of expression and a free press. What should be the roles
of these freedoms in Ireland? What do the Bunreacht and other
sources of law require, and what kind of constitutional analysis
will bring about the proper result? Finally, if such an analysis is
applied to defamation law, what will this body of law look like
afterwards?
A. Do Irish Sources of Law Demand a Higher
Level of Freedom of Expression?
Given the present state of free expression in Ireland, and the
problems of censorship and self-censorship resulting from the
187.

In the only Supreme Court decision involving a freedom of expression

attack on a statute, the Broadcasting Act, the Court upheld the Minister's refusal
to allow the broadcast of an interview with a representative of Sinn Fein. The
State (Lynch) v. Cooney, [1982] I.R. 337, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
IRECAS File. The Court reasoned that, as the political arm of the Irish Republican

Army, Sinn Fein advocates the violent overthrow of the State, and the Minister's
decision was therefore not irrational or capricious. See U The case is troubling,
among other reasons, because the Court allowed the Minister to base his decision
to ban the Simn Fein member's appearance based solely on his membership in a
political group, rather than on any reason to believe the member would actually
advocate violence during the interview. See id.
188. See Michael Foley, Ireland Out of Line with EuropeanPartnerson Press
Freedom, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at 14, available in 1998 WL 6223788
[hereinafter Out of Line].
189. See CASEY, supranote 16, at 437-38.
190. Book Ban to End, TIMES (London), June 18, 1998, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File.

19991

LIBERTY OFEXPRESSION IN IRELAND

419

current state of defamation law, the question must be asked
whether Ireland's constitution or other sources of law demand
greater expression than now exists.
First, what does the Bunreacht require? As mentioned in Part
II, Article 40 contains the Bunreacht's freedom of expression
clause. 19 1 Article 40.6.1 states: "The State guarantees liberty for
the exercise" of the right "of the citizens to express freely their
convictions and opinions," but this right is "subject to public
order and morality." 19 2 The guarantee seems to be further
qualified in the language following, which says that "the
education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such
grave import to the common good," the "organs of public opinion,"
while "preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including
criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine
193
public order or morality or the authority of the State."
Commentators have argued at length about how to understand
this guarantee. But certainly this language enumerates some
individual right of freedom of expression, while it also asserts the
importance of the media's role in informing the public and
criticizing the government.

Article 5 of the Bunreacht declares that Ireland is a
democratic state. 194 A democracy surely requires an informed
public, which requires in turn active and free "organs of public
opinion." If personal freedom of expression and the means to
inform the public are necessary elements of the Irish democratic
state, then if a statute fails to adequately protect these core
values, it is surely unconstitutional, regardless of any other
language that may restrict free expression in some contexts.
Yet the Bunreachtalso protects reputational interests: "The State
shall... by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in
the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and
property rights of every citizen." 19 5 This provision would presumably
prohibit the state from eliminating defamation law altogether, but if
the right to one's good name is read more broadly to mean that it
qualifies the right to speak the truth on matters of public interest
and fully air political opinions and convictions, then it undermines
the very legitimacy of a democratic state. 19 6 Constitutional analysis
should therefore begin with the question of whether free expression is
191.
192.

See supratext accompanying note 63.
IR. CONST. art. 40.6.1i.

193.

Id

194.
195.
196.

state

See id. art. 5; Defamation Value, supranote 94, at 62.
IR. CONST. arts. 40.3.1-2.
This understanding of the centrality of free speech in a democratic
is the premise of 0Dell's article. See Defamation Value, supranote 94, at 57.
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adequately protected in light of democratic values before any attempt
is made to balance the right to free expression with the right to one's
197
good name.
An application of such a standard to Ireland's present situation
makes it clear that speech is not adequately protected in Ireland.
Books are not sold, exposes are not published, investigative reporting
is discouraged. Public figures who are disparaged in the press must
respond with a lawsuit, or risk conceding the truth of a report by
their inaction. Most importantly, libel laws have placed a veil over the
activities of shady business and political interests, perhaps proving
the converse of the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis's adage
that sunlight is the best disinfectant for corruption.1 98
Even if we do not accept the argument that democratic values
require defamation reform, if the Bunreacht's freedom of
expression guarantee is to mean anything, notwithstanding its
qualifiers, it must be understood as supporting more freedom of
expression than currently exists. Article 5 of the Bunreacht,

therefore, demands that libel laws be reformed.
Aside from the Bunreach4 a second source of Irish law also
requires better protection of the liberty of self-expression. As a
member state of the European Community, Ireland is bound by
Community law, including the European Convention on Human
Rights. 19 9 Article 10(1) of the Convention, which Ireland has
signed, 20 0 states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas .... .201 Article 10(2) may, however,
subject this right to such restrictions "as are prescribed by law and
necessary in a democratic society for the protection . . . of the

197. For the argument that the right to express pure political speech must
be an absolute right in a democracy, see Professor Thomas McCoy, Lecture to his
First Amendment class at Vanderbilt University Law School (Jan. 14, 1999) (notes
on file with author).
198.

See Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE

IT 92 (1913).
199. See Defamation Value, supra note 94, at 75. As of January 1998, the
UK had plans to incorporate the European Convention into its law, which would
leave Ireland as the only European Union member that had not made the
Convention part of its domestic law. See Out of Line, supra note 187, at 14. At
present the Irish Supreme Court is considering judgment on the appeal of the de
Rossa case, mentioned in McGonagle, supra note 180. Counsel for the defendant
advanced for the first time before that Court arguments based upon the European
Convention, particularly the proportionality of harm argument, infra at note 206.
200. See Michael Foley, Defamation Once Again, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997,
at 21, available in 1997 WL 12034991 [hereinafter Defamation Once Again].
Interview with Michael Kealey, Solicitor, McCann Fitzgerald, in Dublin, Ireland
(March 12, 1999); see also Newspaper Claims Libel Award to De Rossa Was
Excessive, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 24529146.

201. Defamation Value, supranote 94, at 75 (quoting European Convention
on Human Rights, art. 10(1)).
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reputation and rights of others ....
"22
One Irish scholar, Eoin
ODell, suggests that because a "democratic society" is built upon
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness, an "uninhibited, robust
and wide-open debate 0 3 actually enhances the authority of the
state, and thus for the purposes of defamation law, this clause
imposes no restrictions on the freedom of expression. 20 4 Allowing
reputational interests to restrict certain kinds of true political speech
can hardly be said to serve the needs of democratic society. 2 0 5 And
indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has held that
"necessary" restrictions on expression are those that both serve a
"pressing social need" in a democracy and that are proportionate to
that need.20 6 In light of media's important role in imparting
information to the public, relevant considerations include the value of
2 07
the information, its context, and the aim it seeks to further.
Moreover, commentary and value-judgments are to be given wide
20 8
latitude even when based on facts that are not wholly accurate.

202. Id. (quoting European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10(2)).
203.
Id- at 52 (deriving the phrase from Justice Brennan's majority opinion
in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), the seminal case that
first constitutionalized U.S. defamation law).

204.
205.

See id. at 62, 76.
Furthermore, 01)e11 points out that in the freedom of expression

decision Barthold v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights held that "it
cannot be reasonably considered as necessary in a democratic society to
suppress true statements which are expressed in fair and moderate language,
and which are appropriate to back up legitimate criticism expressed in relation to
a state of affairs of public concern." I&L at 77 (quoting Barthold v. Germany, 6 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 82, para. 80 (1984)). And in a criminal libel case, the Court held that
restricting and punishing certain kinds of political opinions violated the
Convention, noting that requiring a defendant to prove the truth of a value
judgment infringed the right to a hold a free opinion. See id. at 78 (citing Lingens
v. Austria, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373 (1981), paras. 39-46 & n.107). But see id. (citing
Xv. Germany, 9235/81, 29 Eur. Conm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194), which discussed
a case in which the Court held that a German commission permissibly enjoined
the display of posters asserting that the Holocaust had been a hoax, on the
ground that the injunction protected the reputations of Jews in the community.
206.
See id at 76. O'Dell argues that Ireland's current strict liability scheme
of defamation is disproportionate to the end of protecting reputation, since in light
of the right of freedom of expression, the right of reputation should be protected
by the means least restrictive of expression. See id. at 76-77.
In addition, the Convention has been held to mean that the level of damages
awarded in defamation cases must be proportional to the harm done by a
statement. See McGonagle, supranote 180, at 5 (citing Tolstoy v. UK, Eur. H. R.
Rep. (1995)).
207.
See McGonagle, supra note 180, at 5 (citing Thorgeirson v. Iceland,
Eur. H.R. Rep. (1992)).
208.
See id. (citing Thorgeirson). In addition, the Court has held that the
level of damages awarded in defamation cases must be proportionate to the harm
done by the statement. See id. (citing Thorgeirson).
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In addition to the question of exactly how much more
protection the Bunreacht demands, another question remains: by
what means is a right to be protected in the Irish constitutional
scheme? This Note mentioned in its Introduction the
constitutional provision that appears to address this question: the
Bunreacht expressly establishes judicial review as the method for
protecting fundamental rights. 20 9 However, as stated earlier, there
is no strong tradition of constitutional review in Ireland, and in
fact the Irish have at times distrusted judicial power and leaned
toward a more parliamentarian notion of rights.2 1 0 But the
constitutional language is clear, and if Ireland is to be a
democratic state, it must have some means of actually enforcing
its guarantees. Some have argued that it is the Oireachtaswhich
should reform defamation. But leaving reform to legislation is
both impractical and unwise. Impractical because, as many
commentators have pointed out, politicians have little incentive to
foster criticism of government, and much to gain from the status
quo as potential plaintiffs. 2 1 ' Unwise because it is not merely
policy that urges reform-it is the need to protect individual rights

and to preserve full public debate.
Since the mid-1960s, the tide has slowly begun to turn
and
American-style
review
judicial
increased
towards
constitutionalism.2 1 2 In 1964, three years after the judiciary's
constitutionally-mandated reformulation finally occurred, the
Supreme Court overturned its own rule of precedent. 2 13 The next
year, despite its initial defeat, Chief Justice Kennedy's natural law
position (that the Bunreacht could protect rights not enumerated
specifically in its provisions) won acceptance in Ryan v. Attorney
General,2 14 where the Court recognized an extra-constitutional
right of bodily integrity.2 1 5 Scholars believe that Ryan may be the
review,
most important event in the development of Irish judicial
2 16
signaling a "heightened awareness of citizens' rights."
209. See IR. CONsT. art. 34.3.2; text accompanying notes 66-68.
210. See text accompanying notes 69-76.
211. See DefamationReform, supra note 95, at 275.
212. See BETH, supranote22, at 9-13.
213. See id at 9-10. The rule of precedent, discussed in the text
accompanying notes 97-98, held that the Supreme Court itself was to be bound
by its own precedent.
214. [1965] I.R. 294 at 335, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, IRECAS
File.
215. See BETH, supra note 22, at 675. For the importance of this Catholic
contribution to natural rights analysis, see supranote 77 and accompanying text.
216. CASEY, supra note 16, at 24. See also BETH, supra note 22, at 45;
Finlay, supra note 69, at 140. Finlay notes that since Ryan, several
unenumerated personal rights have been acknowledged, including freedom from
torture, the right to litigate, the right to work, and the right of privacy within
marriage. See Finlay, supra note 69, 140. Perhaps ironically, it may be that the
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Scholars have identified several factors that have helped to
propel interpretation of the Bunreacht in the direction of judicial
review and enforcement of individual rights. First, there is the
logical force of the text itself: its provisions on these subjects bear
relatively few other readings. 217 Second, the Bunreacht explicitly
continued in force all older law not in conflict with constitutional
provisions. Because many older laws were flatly inconsistent, the
Court was asked frequently to invalidate laws. 21 8 Third, the
Bunreacht's Catholic aspects, which have led to much natural
rights-based jurisprudence, have therefore aided incidentally
in
2 19
the move towards a more American constitutionalism.
In sum, the Bunreacht guarantees a right of free expression
that current defamation law fails to adequately protect. The
European Convention provides a similar guarantee, and the
European Court of Human Rights has read this guarantee broadly
in light of the importance of the media's role in democratic
society, while seeking also to protect reputational interests. The
Bunreachi provides judicial review as the means of enforcing the
guarantee of constitutional rights, and therefore the Supreme
Court has the power to hear a challenge to current defamation
law.
less "legal" nature of the Bunreachtallows courts to more easily find new personal
rights, even if it may have caused initial reluctance to engage in constitutional
review. For articles dealing with judicial powers generally and judicial review, see
generally Donal Barrington, Some Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, in
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAW, supra

note 65, at 169 (1992); James Casey, Changing the Constitution: Amendment to
Judicial Review, in DE VALERA'S CONSTITUTION AND OURS, supra note 55, at 152;
Declan Costello, The Irish Judge as Law-Maker, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAw, supra note 65, at 159; Fennelly, supra
note 65, at 183; Brian Walsh, The JudicialPower, Justice and the Constitution of
Ireland, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL
LAW, supra note 65, at 145.
217. See BETH, supra note 22, at 12.
218. Seeid. at 12.
219. See id. at 12-13. In addition, scholars have suggested that the Irish
have become increasingly aware of their constitutional rights. See, for instance,
Walsh, who wonders whether the Irish are now as enthusiastic on the subject as
Americans were said to be in an article in THE ECONOMIST, in 1952:
At the first sound of a new argument over the United States Constitution
and its interpretation, the hearts of Americans leap with fearful joy. The
blood stirs powerfully in their veins and a new lustre (sic) brightens their
eyes. Like King Harry's men before Harfleur, they stand like greyhounds
in the slips, straining upon the start. Last week, the old bugle note rang
out, clear and thrilling, calling Americans to a fresh debate on the
Constitution ....
Walsh, supranote 216, at 157 (quoting THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 1952).
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B. The Extent of the Bunreacht'sProtectionof Free
Expression as it Relates to Defamation Law,
and in Light of Other ConstitutionalInterests
Ireland's defamation law does not sufficiently protect the
constitutional guarantee of liberty of expression if, as now, it
hampers the ability of the press to investigate and report accurate
news of political concern to Irish citizens-what might be called
"pure political speech." But the Bunreacht probably does impose
some limits on freedom of expression where the most crucial
underlying values inherent in a democratic state are not
implicated. Guidance in determining how to weigh different
constitutional interests of free expression and reputation against
each other should come from the Bunreacht and its cultural
context.
One model for balancing different rights at stake in
defamation law was presented by Ireland's Law Reform
Commission, in its Report on the Civil Law of Defamation,
published in December of 1991.220 The Commission sets out three
relevant rights: the reputational rights enumerated in Article
40.3, the rights of free expression found in 40.6.1, and an
unenumerated freedom to communicate.2 2 1 The Commission's
discussion of constitutional rights first examines the language of
the Constitution's reputational guarantee. 22 2 Discussion on
liberty of expression ensues with a different approach from its
preceding analysis on reputational rights. 22 3 Rather than first
describing the right in isolation, then suggesting that in practice,
a need to balance rights may be necessary, the Commission notes
the importance of a reading of this provision that balances

220. The Law Reform Commission is a body authorized by the government
to study and recommend legal reforms. See generally COMMISSION PAPER, supra
note 99. It first published a Paper on the Civil Law of Defamation, over 460 pages
long, which represents a comprehensive and detailed examination of current Irish
law, followed by a comparison with U.S. law, and finally by a presentation of its
own equally comprehensive reforms. See generally id It begins with a few
sentences on the purpose of the torts of libel and slander, and then devotes less
than a page to setting out the constitutional rights that must be balanced in
reforming these torts. See id In the Commission's Report, published later that
year, the Commission acknowledged that its Paper had "provoked some spirited
discussion as to the role which can, or should, be played by the Constitution in
shaping a reformed law of defamation," and that some commentators had argued
that the Commission's constitutional analysis was inadequate. LAW REFORM
COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE CIVIL LAW OF DEFAMATION 1-2 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter

COMMISSION REPORT]. It responded with an appendix to its Report, laying out the
constitutional basis for its approach. See id at 110-24
221.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 220, at 110-13.
222.
Seeid.at 110-i1

223.

See id. at I11-12.
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expression against reputation. 2 24 The Commission then
completely sidesteps the issue of constitutional limitations on
defamation that may be imposed by this right, by quoting a
passage from a Supreme Court case that considered the
defamation issue of qualified privilege: "The articulation of public
policy on a matter such as this would seem to be primarily a
matter for the legislature." 2 25 Accepting this statement
uncritically, the Commission grants itself discretion to limit
expression according to its perception of public policy.
The Commission's approach to balancing rights of expression
and reputation is somewhat dismissive of free expression, and it
fails to grasp that a certain minimum level of free expression and
free press must be absolutely assured in defamation law if the
guarantee is to be more than a fiction.2 2 6 Better guidance for
shaping the law of defamation is provided by an approach that
looks at the nature of each of these rights separately before trying
to fit them together.
The Bunreacht's guarantee of free expression is couched in

language that appears to limit its scope. Freedom of expression is
protected subject to the interests of "public order and
morality."2 27 One commentator has said that an interest in
"public order and morality" has little bearing on defamation law
other than to provide a larger context for understanding the
nature of the freedom of expression guarantee.2 2 8 That interest
usually arises instead in the context of obscenity restrictions or
2 29
issues of access to broadcasting.

224. See id- at 112. The Commission thus is able to immediately assert the
constitutionality of the tort of defamation as a limitation on the right of
expression. See id.
225. Id at 112 (quoting Hynes-O'Sullivan v. O'Driscoll, [1988] I.R. 436, 449
(Henchy, J., concurring)). At issue was a qualified privilege defense for those who
pass on defamatory material in the mistaken belief that they have a duty or
interest in receiving the information, or both. See CASEY, supra note 16, at 463
(citing Hynes). The court had refused to hold that the Constitution's freedom of
expression guarantee required such a defense, and determined that the defense
would insufficiently protect the right to one's good name. See id- (citing Hynes).

Commentators have questioned whether the Court's decision struck the
proper balance between the rights of expression and reputation. See ic. at 46364.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
227. IR. CONST. art. 40.6.1.
228.
229.

See CASEY, supranote 16, at 435.
See id. at 435-36. In addition, one scholar points out that the rights of

assembly and association are also "subject to public order and morality," yet
when the issue has arisen, courts have tolerated little restriction of this type on
the right of association. See Fennelly, supranote 65, at 187.
The second clause of Art. 40.6.1(i) states in addition that the media "shall not
be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State." IR.
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Another possible textual limitation on freedom of expression
is suggested by the language of the first clause, expressly

protecting only "convictions and opinions." 23 0 Supreme Court
Justice Costello has found in two decisions that Article 40.6

contains no "right to communicate" one's opinions, but only to
"hold" them, but nevertheless has held that the right to
communicate was an unenumerated right protected by Art.
40.3.1.231 An argument can be made that the phrase "convictions
and opinions" protects opinions but not facts,2 3 2 but many
commentators have rejected this narrow reading. Fennelly argues
that the interpretation is unlikely because protecting only
opinions would lead to extremely complex parsing of statements
to determine which words were entitled to constitutional
protection. 233 O'Dell argues that even a narrow reading of this
phrase would necessitate some protection for "perceptions of
facts," if not facts themselves. 2 3 4 Moreover, current defamation
law allows liability for false information even if its publisher has a

CoNST. art. 40.6.1.i. O'ell argues that the "authority of the State" language
imposes no restriction because the State has no interest in restricting speech,
which actually strengthens a democratic state in the long run. See Defamation
Value, supra note 94, at 60. This argument is essentially the same as was made

in the preceding section: no restriction can be read into the constitution of a
democratic state if that restriction would undermine the state's claim to
legitimacy, namely, majority rule by an informed public. See supra text
accompanying notes 194-97.
230. IR. CONST. art. 40.6.1.i.
231.
See Fennelly, supranote 65, at 186 (citing Paperlink v. Keamey, [1984]
I.L.R.M. 373). Fennelly also makes the point that the third clause of this section
limits freedom of expression with respect to "blasphemous, seditious or indecent
matter," which must include some factual material; therefore, if facts are not
included in the first clause's convictions and opinions language, this limitation
would be superfluous. Id.
232.
For instance, the Law Reform Commission's approach examines
dictionary definitions of "opinion" and "conviction," and determines that neither
encompass factual statements. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 220, at 113.
The Commission acknowledges that the unenumerated "right to communicate"
includes communication of facts, but is only a qualified right, and is therefore
trumped by the fundamental right to one's good name. See id. at 122.
Furthermore, the Commission makes the dubious conclusion that "education of
public opinion" and "criticism of government policy" encompass only opinions.
See id. at 113. This would seem to be at least a debatable point, since surely the
statement "the Government's action in 1994 caused thousands to lose their jobs"
is as much a criticism of government policy as the statement "the Government's
action in 1994 was stupid"; yet the former statement is factual. Lastly, the
Commission finds that even if "rightful liberty of expression" may encompass
some factual assertions, it applies only to organs of public opinion, and not to
citizens generally. Id. at 113-15. The Commission thus concludes that the
Constitution does not require the protection of true assertions. See id. at 122-24.
233.
See generallyFennelly, supranote 65, at 186-92.
234. Defamation Value, supra note 94, at 59.
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subjective belief of its truth, so O'Dell's interpretation would
235
actually support some minimal defamation reform.
Finally, the Bunreachfs guarantee of freedom of expression
must be read against the government's duty to protect the "good
name" of its citizens. Bunreacht na hireannstates:
3.
1° The State guarantees in it laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights

of the citizen.
20 The State shall, in particular, by its law protect as best it
may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate
the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen.

2 36

Much of the preceding analysis in this Note discusses minimal
protections any democratic state must provide in order to
function as a democracy. However, any constitutional analysis
must take into account some unique elements of Irish law and
culture. The Irish attach enormous importance to reputation.
American cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan, that were so
quick to assert the importance of free speech as against a
common law right to vindicate one's name, were born of a
different culture from those of many Irish cases.2 3 7 Ireland is still
largely agrarian, sparsely populated and poor, although it has

experienced increased prosperity in the last few years. 238 An
individual's success, and until recently, survival, depended upon
her good name. 23 9 Ireland's history of English oppression,
followed by civil war, serve to make reputation even more
important, and tenuous. For instance, once denounced as a
asouper," a label for those who denied their Catholicism in order
to receive English food, a person immediately lost all status in her
community. 2 4° During Ireland's civil war in the 1920's, one's
reported allegiance to one army or the other, each claiming to
represent the true Irish government, was, of course, a life-or235.

See id.
236.
IR. CONST. arts. 40.3.1-2.
237.
In addition, New York Times v. Sullivan involved a very unconvincing
reputational interest, since an Alabama resident was suing a paper with a very
tiny circulation in Alabama. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260
n.3 (1964).

238. For a discussion of the Irish economy since the 1950s, see RANELAGH,
supranote 23, at 240-44.
239. Marie McGonagle has suggested that Ireland's history of dispossession
and poverty have contributed to the high value the Irish people place on
reputation. See Defamation Once Again, supra note 200, at 21 (quoting Marie
McGonagle).

240. See Malachy McCourt, Commentary on Surviving Poverty in Free
Ireland, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1998, at B7, available in 1998 WL 18897821.
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death concern. 2 4 1 Perhaps as a result of this history, Irish
attachment to reputation has an almost sacred quality, and
defaming someone's character is an act deserving great moral
condemnation.2 4 2 The tort of defamation thus has an important
role to play in enabling an individual to vindicate her name,
although no cases have explored exactly what protections
defamation law must provide for reputation. 24 The constitutional
language requires the state to ensure that individuals may
vindicate their good name against "unjust attack"; it is thought
that the release of truthful information is not unjust unless,
perhaps, it relates to events long past and irrelevant to the public
2
interest. 44
In sum, the Bunreacht's freedom of expression guarantee is
particularly concerned with protecting commentary, or "opinions
and convictions," and assuring that the media is able to provide
for debate on matters of concern to the public. Read in relation to
the whole of Article 40, the apparent limitation on the right for
the sake of "public order and morality" was not necessarily
intended to authorize restraint of speech every time policy seems
to outweigh the value of the information. Similarly, the phrase
"convictions and opinions" probably does not exclude facts from
protection. The Bunreacht also protects the right to protect one's

reputation from "unjust attack." This protection is a serious
matter for Irish citizens, and probably forbids a constitutional law
of defamation that weighs so heavily in favor of defendants as in
the United States.
C. ProposedReforms of the Law of Defamation
In the preceding section, this Note discussed the nature of
Ireland's freedom of expression and reputation guarantees. With
that
this discussion in mind, this Note will suggest some reforms
2 45
will allow both of these rights to be adequately protected.

241.

See supra text on Irish history accompanying notes 32-34.

242. Ireland is not alone in this respect. See, for instance, Religion professor
Susannah Heschel's article condemning Jews who have supported Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation and exposure of intimate details of
President Clinton's private life. See Eric J. Greenberg, The Casefor Teshuvah: In
Wake of Schorsch Call for Resignation, Other Leading Rabbis Say Clinton Can
Redeem Himself, JEWISH WEEK, Sept. 18, 1998, at 1 (paraphrasing Susannah
Heschel).

243. See Defamation Value, supranote 94, at 64.
244. See id. at 65.
245. Among the articles recently suggesting defamation reforms, or
critiquing the Law Reform Commission's approach, are Eoin O'Dell, Reflections on
a Revolution in Libel, 9 IRISH L. TIMES 181 (Aug. 1991); Defamation Reform, supra
note 95, at 270. In addition, the Law Review Commission's comprehensive study
of defamation law presents a detailed set of proposals for reform in its Paper and
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The Bunreacht clearly protects pure opinions, or subjective
beliefs. Yet defamation law assumes that a statement is false. A
defendant therefore must prove that a statement is true in order
to avoid liability (justification), unless she can argue the defense
of fair comment, which requires that the comment be based on
true facts on a subject of public interest. 2 46 This scheme fails to
protect pure opinions that are not considered to relate to a
subject of public interest, because a defendant cannot prove such
opinions to be true. Irish courts have construed public interest
narrowly, so most opinions fall outside the fair comment
247
defense.
But if the Supreme Court or lawmakers shift the burden to
the plaintiff to prove the falsity of a statement, then pure
opinions, whether or not in the public interest, will not incur
liability, because plaintiffs will be unable to prove them false. This
shift in the burden of proof would have several advantages
besides enforcing the Bunreacht's protection of "convictions and
opinions." Much of the complex and uncertain task of
distinguishing between fact and opinion would become
unnecessary. Plaintiffs would be able to sue on convictions based
on untrue statements, but only to the extent that they could
disprove a verifiable statement. The defense of fair comment could
then be eliminated, a move that has the benefit of avoiding
judicial discretion on the value judgment of whether a statement

addresses a subject of public interest. This burden shift would
also bring the tort of defamation into conformity with other
common law torts, in which the plaintiff carries the burden of
proving the main elements of the tort.
The Law Reform Commission proposed such a burden shift in
its Report, reversing its earlier recommendation.2 48 The U.S.
Supreme Court adopted this alteration in the common law in
PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.2 49 In a majority opinion
in a later case, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., Justice Rehnquist
rejected the suggestion that all opinions should be privileged, and
relied on the presumption of truth to protect opinions rather than

its Report. These publications, while they have not yet been adopted in the
Oireachtas, have spurred greater debate among legal scholars. This Note does not
attempt to outline and critique all of the LRC's proposals, but instead seeks to
touch on some of the most important areas of reform.
246.
See supratext accompanying notes 115-26.
247.
See id.
248.
Compare COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 321-26 (upholding the
burden on the defendant to prove truth), with COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
220, at 55-57 (acknowledging that it may be unreasonable for the defendant to
carry this burden).
249.
475 U.S. 767, 778-79 (1986).
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on "an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact."25 o A
conviction such as, "In my opinion Mayor Jones, a professed
Communist, shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the
teachings of Marx and Lenin," cannot be proven false in a court of
law; a plaintiff would therefore be unable to rebut the
presumption of truth. 25 1 On the other hand, "In my opinion
Mayor Jones is a liar" implies certain instances of lying which, if
proven false, could be the basis of a successful suit.2 52 The
abolition of the presumption of falsity is therefore an important
first reform of Irish defamation law.
In addition to shifting the truth/falsity presumption, several
commentators have recommended a move from strict liability to
the requirement of some kind of fault. O'Dell has argued forcefully
that this move is required by the Bunreacht's protection of
"convictions," which include perceptions of fact. 25 3 Therefore, if a
publisher holds an honest belief in the truth of a fact, this belief
would seem to require some protection. 2 s 4 The Law Reform
Commission has proposed the adoption of a defense of reasonable
care.2 55 The Commission adopted this position to address the
reality that even after thorough research, a publisher with the
best of intentions could still publish a false statement that has a
defamatory effect on an individual. The Commission took note of
the American decision that the First Amendment requires some
showing of fault before an individual can be held liable in a
defamation suit.2 5 6 But in U.S. case law, the standard of care
differs according to the plaintiff: recklessness is the minimum
level of fault in cases brought by public figures, while negligence
is sufficient for private figures. 25 7 The Commission found this

distinction between plaintiffs undesirable and insufficiently
protective of reputation, and adopted instead a universal defense
of reasonable care.2 5 8 Under this standard, a defendant would
have the opportunity to prove that the defendant had not been
25 9
negligent or otherwise at fault for publishing a false statement.
A defendant who succeeds in such a defense is responsible only
for specific financial loss resulting from the publication, and not
general damages.2 60 This is a major shift from traditional common

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990).
See id.
See id.
See Defamation Value, supranote 94, at 59-60, 66-70.
See id.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 220, at 49-55.
See COMMISSION PAPER, supranote 99, at 316-17.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 220, at 49.
See id. at 49-50.
See COMMISSION PAPER, supranote 99, at 317-18.
See il.

1999]

LIBERTY OFEXPRESSION IN IRELA ND

law, but the burden of proof falls on the defendant to prove lack
of negligence-a very hard standard to satisfy.
This fault standard represents a middle ground between the
U.S. requirement that public figures prove "actual malice," and
the current strict liability standard. It would appear to preserve
the right to vindicate one's good name against "unjust attacks,"
since false information reported after diligent research is arguably
not "unjust."
Probably neither placing the burden of proving falsity on the
plaintiff, nor allowing a reasonable care defense, would have
warded off liability in Campbell-Sharp v. Independent Newspapers
(MRE), Ltd.,2 6 1 however, because Campbell-Sharp proved she was
technically not Leonard's debtor. In addition, although Leonard's
mistake was an honest and understandable one, he probably
would not have succeeded in his defense of reasonable care, since
Campbell-Sharp was able to prove in hindsight that the truth was
26 2
available to Leonard at the time.

Although a U.S.-type distinction between plaintiffs is
probably inappropriate in Ireland, freedom of expression probably
demands a privilege for defaming public officials regarding their
conduct in office. Public officials should not be allowed to win
private damages for criticism of their conduct insofar as they are
state actors. Allowing such suits is too similar to a criminal
sanction for criticizing the government, and restrains some of the
speech that is most important to a democracy. In this respect, the
New York Times v. Sullivan2 6 3 analysis of the Alien and Sedition
2 64
Acts offers an important lesson for Irish lawmakers and courts.
Defamation damages are in particular need of reform. The
outcome in the Campbell-Sharp26 5 case seems unreasonable
because although Leonard's accusation that Campbell-Sharp
owed him money cast her in a bad light, it seems unlikely that
Campbell-Sharp suffered any lasting injury to her reputation.
More emphasis could be placed on the existence of an injury. At
present, the injury is presumed in libel, but juries seem to base

261. No. 5557 (Ir. H.Ct May 6, 1997).
262. McDonald believes arguments benefiting from this kind of hindsight
present a real problem for the viability of this defense. See Defamation Reform,

supranote 95, at 272-73.
263. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). That decision adopted a constitutional rule
requiring "public officials" to prove actual malice. See id. at 283.
264. McDonald points out, however, that statutory defamation reform is
unlikely precisely because legislators are among the most common plaintiffs in

defamation suits. See Defamation Reform, supranote 95, at 275.
265. No. 5557 (Ir. H. Ct. May 6, 1997).
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damages not on injury to reputation, but on emotional
hurt,
266
damage to dignity, and the attitude of the alleged defamer.
In addition, freedom of expression would be better protected
if courts required that damages be proportionate to harm, taking
into account the importance of freedom of expression. Appeal
from a judgment could be available based on this principle, which
has been adopted already by the European Court of Human
2 67
Rights.
Aggravated damages are a particularly pernicious element of
the present damages scheme. Courts must no longer be allowed
to impose aggravated damages based on the unsuccessful attempt
to prove either the truth of a statement or a plaintiffs bad
character. Such conduct naturally falls under a privilege for
speech relevant to a judicial proceeding. To allow damages based
on this conduct is to undermine any protections for speech that
defamation law affords. This reform, in conjunction with a
proportionate damages requirement, would have provided a better
result in the Campbell-Sharp case, and may have prevented the
suit altogether, if Campbell-Sharp was motivated primarily by the
potential for a huge damage award. This reform nevertheless
ensures that plaintiffs can continue to vindicate attacks on their
reputation and receive fair compensation for their injuries.
Finally, current defamation law grants courts wide discretion
in granting injunctions.2 6 A plaintiff may obtain an ex parte
injunction against publication of supposedly defamatory materials
pending a hearing, before the material has been printed. At that
ex parte hearing, a court may grant a further injunction on
publication until the case has gone to trial. Although some
authorities emphasize that such interlocutory injunctions must
not be issued lightly, judges appear to employ tests of varying
strictness.2 69 The Law Reform Commission is right in
recommending that injunctions be limited to cases where a
plaintiff can prove the likelihood of success on the merits, and not
just the "defamatory" nature of the statement. 27 0 Disturbingly,
266.
267.

See Defamation Reform, supranote 95, at 271.
See supradiscussion accompanying notes 198-208.

268. See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 258-59. Irish courts'
jurisdiction over injunctions in defamation actions is fairly recent, dating only
from 1877. See id
269. See COMMISSION PAPER, supranote 99, at 129-33, 364-65; IRISH LAw OF
DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 258-63. In fact, ex parte injunctions may be the
easiest to obtain. See IRISH LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note 89, at 260. See also
IRT Law Report, Evidence of Justification Needed to Defeat Libel Interlocutory
Injunction Claim, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999, at 18, available in 1999 WL 6182959
(reporting on the decision of Reynolds v. Malocco (Ir. H. Ct. Dec. 11, 1998)).
270.
See COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 99, at 364. For an example of a
recent controversy over a libel injunction, see Marie McGonagle, Battle Over Bank
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under current law plaintiffs can not only easily block the
publication of disparaging materials, they can also prevent the
press from reporting the fact of the injunction. 27 1 The Law Reform
Commission's recommendation that this ban be lifted should be
adopted, 2 7 2 as ex ante restraints on free speech are particularly
damaging to public debate, and beyond the scope of the
Bunreacht's reputation
guarantee,
which
merely
allows
vindication after the fact.

V. CONCLUSION

This Note has suggested that Irish defamation law is in need
of reform, because the current combination of statute and
common law has produced an atmosphere in which the press is
justifiably afraid to criticize those in the public eye, and
defamation suits have become big business. It has examined the
sources of Irish defamation law, and some of the conditions under
which they have developed. Further, it has borrowed from several
models of defamation reform, including U.S. law and the
recommendations of the Law Review Commission, and provided
its own suggestions for reform. Most importantly, however, this
Note has made the argument that any reform of defamation
should be constitutionally based, and developed through judicial
review, and has argued that the Irish Constitution both allows
and demands that this development occur.
The Bunreacht supports a broad freedom of expression, one
that may be narrower than the protection provided by the U.S.
First Amendment, but one that is fuller than current libel laws
provide. That guarantee of freedom of expression is best served by
placing the law of defamation within a careful constitutional
interpretation analysis that takes account of both reputational
interests and the need for full public debate. Such an analysis
should not pit these guarantees against each other haphazardly

Story Raises ImportantIssues, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at 16, available in 1998
WL 6230718, relating the story of a series of television reports investigating an
Irish bank's involvement with certain offshore accounts. See also Marie
McGonagle, This DecisionEnhances the Reputation of the Press and the Judiciary,
IRISH TIMES, Mar. 21, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 6232973 (discussing the
lifting of the injunction in the NIB/RTE case); Editorial, Serving the Public Interest,
IRISH TIMES, Mar. 21, 1998, at 17, available in 1998 WL 6233074 (reporting the
Supreme Court's refusal to extend the injunction).
271.
See Defamation Reform, supra note 95, at 272. McDonald points out
that this ban prevents the public from learning what writers are effectively being
blacklisted as a result of such prior restraints. See id.
272.
See COMMISSION PAPER, supranote 99, at 364.
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in each case to see which seems more important on particular
facts. It should instead attempt to build a body of law that will
protect the core interests of each guarantee simultaneously. A
constitutional law of defamation based on such an analysis might
adopt among other measures, the specific reforms suggested here:
a shift in the burden of proving falsity, a new reasonable care
defense, a proportional damages rule, the elimination of
aggravated damages, and the abolition of injunctions in most
circumstances.
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